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Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce: Addressing a "New
Corruption" in Campaign Financing
For nearly twenty years, Congress and the Supreme Court have struggled
to define a comprehensive and effective system of campaign finance regulation.
Many state legislatures have enacted parallel reform efforts.1 Yet, until recently,
the constitutionality of regulations governing corporate spending in candidate
elections remained uncertain.
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce2 the Supreme Court held that
governments may restrict the right of many corporations to make independent
expenditures 3 on behalf of political candidates.4 The Austin Court articulated a
new constitutional standard for evaluating campaign finance regulation. Such
regulation, the Court held, is constitutionally justified because of the distorting
effects of corporate wealth on the marketplace of ideas. 5 This Note examines the
Austin opinion in its historical context. The Note concludes that the Court's
decision to permit regulation on the basis of a speaker's wealth and corporate
form constitutes a significant departure from previous campaign finance juris-
prudence and may well spark efforts to regulate other forms of speech on similar
grounds.
In 1985 leaders of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a nonprofit corpo-
ration, 6 decided to use funds from the Chamber's general treasury to place a
newspaper advertisement urging voters to support a particular candidate in an
upcoming special election to the Michigan State House.7 The advertisement
would have violated Michigan campaign finance laws prohibiting the expendi-
1. For a list of state statutes regulating political speech by corporations, see Note, Corporate
Political Speech on Political Issues: The First Amendment in Conflict with Democratic Ideals?, 1985
U. ILL. L. REv. 445, 470-72. For a list of state statutes restricting corporate expenditures on behalf
of candidates for political office, see infra note 8.
2. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
3. Most campaign finance statutes distinguish between contributions, which are payments or
other benefits paid or delivered directly to the candidate or his committee, and independent expendi-
tures, which are payments or other activities undertaken on behalf of a candidate, but not under his
direction or control. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8), (17) (1988). Typical examples of independent expendi-
tures are newspaper and television advertisements endorsing a candidate, but placed and paid for by
persons unconnected with the candidate's campaign. This Note uses the terms "independent expen-
diture" and "expenditure" synonymously. For a discussion of the constitutional significance of the
distinction between contributions and independent expenditures, see infra notes 45-50 and accompa-
nying text.
4. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1402. Many state statutes distinguish candidate elections from ballot
issue elections. Candidate elections involve the election of a candidate to office. Ballot issue elec-
tions generally are referred to as referenda and involve voter approval or disapproval of a particular
proposition, such as an amendment to a state's statutes or constitution. See, eg., MIcH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 169.202(1), .205(1) (1990).
5. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
6. At the time of filing, the Michigan Chamber consisted of 8,000 members, three-quarters of
whom were corporations. Id. at 1395.
7. Id. at 1396. The Chamber proposed to place a quarter-page advertisement in the Grand
Rapids Press. Id. Entitled "Michigan Needs Richard Bandstra to Help Us Be Job Competitive
Again," the text of the advertisement included a short summary of the goals of the Michigan Cham-
ber, its concerns about state economic and regulatory policy, and an endorsement of Bandstra as a
candidate with "the background and training to do the best job" in the state house. Id. at 1427. A
1991] CAMPAIGN FINANCING 1061
ture of corporate funds in state candidate elections.8 Arguing that these restric-
tions were unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments, the
Chamber brought suit seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the law in
federal district court.9 The district court upheld the statute,10 but the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the restrictions violated
the first amendment.1 1 A divided Supreme Court reversed the appellate court,
copy of the advertisement, which would have cost approximately $1,100, is appended to the Court's
opinion in Austin. Id.
8. Michigan Campaign Finance Act, 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 388 (codified at MICH. COMP.
LAws §§ 169.201-.282 (1990)). The Act provides:
Sec. 54 (1) Except with respect to the exceptions and conditions in subsection (2) and
section 55, and to loans made in the ordinary course of business, a corporation may not
make a contribution or expenditure or provide volunteer personal services which services
are excluded from the definition of a contribution pursuant to section 4(3)(a).
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 169.254(1) (1990). An independent expenditure is defined as an expenditure
"not made at the direction of, or under the control of, another person," and not made as a contribu-
tion. Id. § 169.209(1). The prohibition does not apply to independent corporate expenditures relat-
ing to ballot issues. Id. § 169.254(3). Violation of the law is a felony. Id. § 169.254(4).
The statute also provides that, while barred from making direct expenditures of general treasury
funds, a corporation may establish a segregated fund to be used for political purposes. Id.
§ 169.255(1). Corporations may spend general treasury funds to establish, administer, and solicit
contributions to the fund. Id. When such a fund is established by a nonprofit corporation, contribu-
tions to the fund may be solicited from members of the corporation who are individuals, stockhold-
ers of members of the corporation, officers or directors of members of the corporation, and certain
employees of members of the corporation. Id. § 169.255(3)(a)-(d).
The Michigan statute is similar to provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112, 90 Stat. 475, 490-92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988)),
which prohibit corporate and labor union contributions and expenditures in connection with candi-
dates for federal office. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988). At least eighteen states place similar restrictions on
corporate contributions and expenditures. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-2A-70, 10-2A-70.1, 10-2A-70.2
(1987 & Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-333 (West Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 56.29 (West Supp. 1990); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 121.025, 121.035 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982
& Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.15 (West Supp. 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-13-15
(Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 664:4(I) (1986);
N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 14-116 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.19 (1987);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.03 (Anderson Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3253 (Purdon
Supp. 1990); TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 251.010 (Vernon 1986); W. VA. CODE §§ 3-8-8, 3-9-14
(1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.38 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990). Several states have statutes that,
though not expressly prohibiting corporate independent expenditures on behalf of candidates, might
be construed to impose such restrictions. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08-02(.1) (Supp. 1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4219 (West Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 12-25-2 (1982);
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 2-19-132 (Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 22-25-102 (Supp. 1990).
9. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396. Notably, the Chamber had already established, and was ad-
ministering successfully, a separate political fund of the type authorized by Michigan law. Id.; see
supra note 8. Indeed, the Chamber's segregated fund was expected to contain more than $140,000 in
time for use in the 1986 elections. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396.
10. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397, 405-06 (W.D. Mich.
1986), rev'd, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). The district court found
that while the statute "strikes at speech within the traditional core of the First Amendment," the
restriction was justified by a compelling state interest in "preventing the appearance of corruption in
elections for public office." Id. at 403. Specifically, the court found that the "great aggregations of
capital" amassed with the aid of the corporate form, combined with the "faceless nature of corpora-
tions" could "create an atmosphere of distrust or the appearance of corruption in the electoral pro-
cess." Id. The court rejected claims that the statute violated the Chamber's equal protection rights
by distinguishing between the Chamber, in its capacity as a corporation, and persons expending
funds as individuals. Id. at 404-05. The court also held that the statute's provisions exempting
publications by broadcast and print media did not discriminate between media corporations and
other corporations because any corporation "may avail itself of the exemption." Id. at 405.
11. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 856 F.2d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 1988), ree'd,
110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). The circuit court held that the Chamber did not "surrender its first amend-
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holding the statute constitutional under both the first and fourteenth
amendments. 12
Justice Marshall, writing for a six-member majority, found that although
the statute burdened political expression, 13 it was constitutional because it was
"narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest." 14 Specifically, Justice
Marshall noted that the Michigan statute sought to control "the corrosive and
distorting effects" of wealth accumulated through the special advantages of the
corporate form and having "little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas." 15 This objective, he added, was consistent
with previous decisions recognizing a compelling government interest in restrict-
ing "'the influence of political war chests funnelled through the corporate
form.'"16 Further, Justice Marshall pointed out that the statute was narrowly
tailored to the extent that it did not "impose an absolute ban on all forms of
corporate political spending but permit[ted] corporations to make independent
political expenditures through separate segregated funds."' 17 Justice Marshall
rejected arguments that the statute was overbroad in including close corpora-
tions and underinclusive in excluding unincorporated labor unions.18
ment rights merely by assuming the corporate form of organization." Id. at 787 (citing First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). Further, the court found the statute was not justified by
a compelling government interest. Id. at 790 (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (striking a similar federal statute as applied to a nonprofit
corporation)); see infra notes 80-99 and accompanying text. The court of appeals in Austin found
that the state could have no justification for restricting the Chamber's political speech rights as a
nonprofit group. Austin, 856 F.2d at 789-90.
12. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1401-02.
13. Id. at 1396-97. The Court reiterated earlier holdings regarding the nature of political and
corporate speech, writing:
Certainly, the use of funds to support a political candidate is "speech"; independent cam-
paign expenditures constitute "political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and
of the First Amendment freedoms.'" The mere fact that the Chamber is a corporation
does not remove its speech from the ambit of the First Amendment.
Id. at 1396 (citations omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (per curiam) (quot-
ing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968))).
14. Id. at 1396, 1398.
15. Id. at 1397. Justice Marshall acknowledged previous decisions which held that legislative
concern over financial quid pro quo corruption was insufficient to justify restrictions on independent
expenditures, but suggested that the Michigan statute concerned "a different type of corruption in
the political arena." Id.
The Court was careful to emphasize that "the mere fact that corporations may accumulate large
amounts of wealth is not the justification for [the statute]; rather, the unique state-conferred corpo-
rate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent
expenditures." Id. at 1398.
16. Id. at 1397 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985) and citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).
17. Id. at 1398. The Court noted that such expenditures were permissible "[b]ecause persons
contributing to such funds understand that their money will be used solely for political purposes."
Thus, "the speech generated accurately reflects contributors' support for the corporation's political
views." Id.
18. Id. at 1398, 1400. The Court explained that close corporations, though usually possessed of
relatively small amounts of capital, are nevertheless endowed with the corporate form and, therefore,
have the potential for amassing significant capital. Id. at 1398. Justice Marshall pointed out that
unincorporated labor unions, by contrast, lack the corporate form. Id. at 1400. Justice Marshall
further noted that previous holdings of the Court have made it clear that unions cannot use com-
pelled fees for political activities if contributing union members object. Id. (citing Communications
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Justice Marshall also dismissed assertions that the statute was unconstitu-
tional as applied because of the Chamber's nonprofit status. The majority ac-
knowledged that it had exempted an ideological nonprofit corporation from the
requirements of a similar statute in Federal Election Commission it Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life. 19 Justice Marshall, however, held that the Chamber's cor-
porate membership,20 its nonideological purposes, 2 1 and its members' potential
reluctance to withdraw from the organization because of its political expendi-
tures22 distinguished the Chamber's structure and operations from those of Mas-
sachusetts Citizens for Life.2 3
Finally, the majority addressed the fourteenth amendment challenge to the
statute. The Court noted that the same compelling state interests that supported
the statute's constitutionality under the first amendment applied to any equal
protection analysis as well.24 Thus, Justice Marshall again rejected arguments
that the statute's restrictions were underinclusive in omitting unincorporated as-
sociations such as labor unions.25 Justice Marshall also dismissed arguments
that the statute's exemption for media organizations26 violated the equal protec-
tion clause, noting that "[a]lthough the press' unique societal role may not enti-
tle the press to a greater protection under the Constitution, it does provide a
compelling reason for the State to exempt media corporations from the scope of
political expenditure limitations." 27
The majority's holding sparked bitter dissents from Justices Scalia and
Kennedy.28 Justice Scalia mockingly dubbed the Court's "corrosive and dis-
torting effects" language "The New Corruption" 29 and lambasted the majority
as endorsing "the principle that too much speech is an evil that the democratic
Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977)).
19. 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986); see infra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
20. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1400 ("As we read the Act, a [for-profit] corporation's payments into
the Chamber's general treasury ... would not be subject to the Act's limitations. Business corpora-
tions therefore could circumvent the Act's restrictions by funnelling money through the Chamber's
general treasury.").
21. The Chamber's bylaws enumerate both political and nonpolitical purposes. Id. at 1395-96.
22. Id. at 1399 ("The Chamber's political agenda is sufficiently distinct from its educational and
outreach programs that members who disagree with the former may continue to pay dues to partici-
pate in the latter.").
23. Id. at 1400.
24. Id. at 1401.
25. Id.
26. The statute provides that "an expenditure by a broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine,
or other periodical or publication for any news story, commentary, or editorial in support of or
opposition to a candidate for elective office or a ballot question in the regular course of publication or
broadcasting" does not qualify as an expenditure for the purposes of the Act. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 169.206(3)(d) (1990).
Federal election campaign law contains a similar exemption for "any news story, commentary,
or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or
other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party,
political committee, or candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1988).
27. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1402.
28. See id. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1416 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
filed a separate concurrence supporting the majority.and addressing in detail many of the arguments
put forward in the dissents. Id. at 1402 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 1411 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the majority posits "a hitherto
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majority can proscribe."'30 Justice Scalia repudiated the notion that the "special
advantage" of corporate form could be a basis for regulating corporate speech 3'
and reminded the majority that the Court's previous decisions had rejected spe-
cifically the proposition that "expenditures must 'reflect actual public support
for the political ideas espoused.' "32 Moreover, Justice Scalia argued that al-
lowing regulation of close corporations on the basis of their "potential" for
amassing wealth severely undermined the Court's well-established "clear and
present danger" test for limiting political speech.33 "The premise of our sys-
tem," Justice Scalia wrote, "is that there is no such thing as too much speech-
that the people are not foolish but intelligent, and will separate the wheat from
the chaff."'34
Justice Kennedy's dissent, in which Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined,
was equally biting.35 Justice Kennedy argued that the statute's clear discrimina-
tion on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity constituted "the rawest form
of censorship."' 36 He also challenged the majority's willingness to accept a spe-
unrecognized genus of political corruption" which may be identified by its politically corrosive ef-
fects. Id. at 1410-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)); see also id. at 1418-19 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating
that regulation on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity is the "rawest form of censorship")
(citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
32. Id. at 1411 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397 (majority opinion)
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976))); see also id. at 1420-21 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that independent expenditures cannot foster corruption because corruption involves the
prospect of financial gain on the part of a candidate) (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 491, 496-97 (1985); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam)).
33. Id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing cases in support of this test).
34. Id. at 1416 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia argued as follows:
Despite all the talk about "corruption and the appearance of corruption"-evils that
are not significantly implicated and that can be avoided in many other ways-it is entirely
obvious that the object of the law we have approved today is not to prevent wrongdoing,
but to prevent speech. Since those private associations known as corporations have so
much money, they will speak so much more, and their views will be given inordinate prom-
inence in election campaigns. This is not an argument that our democratic traditions al-
low-neither with respect to individuals associated in corporations nor with respect to
other categories of individuals whose speech may be "unduly" extensive or "unduly" per-
suasive (because they are movie stars) or "unduly" respected (because they are clergymen).
The premise of our system is that there is no such thing as too much speech-that the
people are not foolish but intelligent, and will separate the wheat from the chaff. As con-
ceded in Lincoln's aphorism about fooling "all of the people some of the time," that prem-
ise will not invariably accord with reality; but it will assuredly do so much more frequently
than the premise the Court today embraces: that a healthy democratic system can survive
the legislative power to prescribe how much political speech is too much, who may speak
and who may not.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Justice Kennedy wrote:
With the imprimatur of this Court, it is now a felony in Michigan for the Sierra Club, or
the American Civil Liberties Union, or the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, to
advise the public how a candidate voted on issues of urgent concern to their members. In
both practice and theory, the prohibition aims at the heart of political debate.
Id. at 1418 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the issues surrounding Justice Kennedy's
assertion, see infra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
36. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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cial statutory distinction for media corporations, reminding the majority that
"'the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those
enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities.' ,,37
Though legislative efforts to control campaign contributions and expendi-
tures in the United States began as early as 1907,38 modem federal campaign
finance jurisprudence centers largely in the Federal Election Campaign Act of
197139 and amendments to that Act adopted by Congress in 197440 and 1976.41
37. Id. at 1425 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985)). Justice Kennedy continued: "The argument relied on by the major-
ity, that media corporations are in the business of communicating and other corporations are not, is
unsatisfying. All corporations communicate with the public to some degree, whether it is their busi-
ness or not." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia observed:
[I]f one believes the Court's rationale of "compelling state need" to prevent amassed corpo-
rate wealth from skewing the political debate, surely [the] "unique role" of the press does
not give Michigan justification for excluding media corporations from coverage, but pro-
vides especially strong reason to include them. Amassed corporate wealth that regularly
sits astride the ordinary channels of information is much more likely to produce the New
Corruption (too much of one point of view) than amassed corporate wealth that is gener-
ally busy making money elsewhere.
Id. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1402) (majority opinion) (emphasis
in original).
38. In 1907 Congress adopted the Tiliman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907), prohib-
iting corporate contributions to federal campaigns. A chief proponent of the Act was President
Theodore Roosevelt, whose support reflected concern over the ability of large companies to buy
influence in the political process. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilem-
mas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 60 (1987). The Act was only marginally
effective however, id. at 60-61, and in 1925 Congress moved to strengthen regulation of campaign
financing through the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 (FCPA). Pub. L. No. 68-506, § 301-
19, 43 Stat. 1053, 1070-74 (1925) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.), repealed by
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 stat. 3, 20 (1972). Nahra,
supra, at 62. Although intended as a comprehensive regulation of federal campaign financing, loop-
holes in the FCPA rendered it largely ineffective. Id.
39. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended in §§ 2, 18, and 47 of U.S.C.) [hereinafter FECA of 1971]. Enactment of the 1971 Act was
prompted by scholarly and political concern over the ineffectiveness of the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act. Nahra, supra note 38, at 64. "The 1971 Act imposed a number of significant restrictions on
federal campaign spending, including requirements for low-cost political advertising, ceilings on me-
dia expenditures by candidates, limitations on a candidate's personal expenditures, a strengthening
of the prohibitions on corporate and labor union contributions, . . and mandatory disclosure of
campaign contributions." Id. (footnotes omitted). The constitutionality of the provisions was
"questioned extensively subsequent to their passage." Id. at 65; see R. WINTER, WATERGATE AND
THE LAW 25 (1974). The Act, however, never was challenged in court, primarily because of the
demonstrated need for further reform in the wake of the Watergate scandal. Nabra, supra note 38,
at 65.
40. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, and 47 of U.S.C.) [hereinafter FECA of
1974]. "The 1974 Act... targeted four primary goals: disclosure of campaign financial activity,
prevention of corruption stemming from the influence of large contributors, reduction of campaign
spending so as to bring about an equality of spending among candidates for federal office, and invigo-
ration of the election process." Nahra, supra note 38, at 66.
41. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, and 26 U.S.C) [hereinafter FECA of 1976]. Of
particular relevance to corporate campaign finance regulation were provisions of the 1976 Act that
consolidated and clarified federal restrictions on corporate campaign contributions and independent
expenditures. See FECA of 1976, supra, § 321, 90 Stat. 475, 490-92 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b). The operative statute, which has remained substantially unaltered since its enactment,
provides:
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law
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Among the most controversial of the reform measures were statutes limiting
campaign contributions by groups and individuals to a single candidate to 1,000
dollars per election42 and establishing a similar limit of 1,000 dollars per year for
independent expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate." 43
The new contribution and expenditure limitations, and other provisions of
the Federal Election Campaign Act, were challenged in the landmark Supreme
Court case, Buckley v. Valeo.44 In Buckley the Court struck down substantial
portions of the new regulatory scheme as unconstitutional constraints on first
amendment freedoms of speech and association.45 In particular, the Buckley
Court found that while government interests in campaign finance regulation jus-
tify limitations on campaign contributions, similar restrictions on independent
expenditures do not outweigh individual and societal interests in free speech and
the unimpeded exchange of political ideas.46
The rationale behind the Buckley Court's distinction between contributions
and independent expenditures was twofold. First, though firmly stating that all
campaign-connected spending constitutes protected speech,47 the Court asserted
that restrictions on independent expenditures "necessarily reduce[ ] the quantity
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached."'4 8 In contrast, the Court
classified contributions as a significantly more symbolic form of speech, the limi-
tation of which entails only marginal restrictions upon the contributor's ability
of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any
political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus
held to select candidates for any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any
labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election
at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a
Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with
any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of
the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person knowingly
to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section.
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1988). The section specifically exempts from the phrase "contribution or expen-
diture" expenditures for "the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a
separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation [or] labor organiza-
tion." Id. § 441b(b)(2)(C).
42. FECA of 1974, supra note 40, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1263 (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a (1982)).
43. Id., § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1265 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608) (repealed 1976) (held uncon-
stitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam)).
44. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 143.
46. Id. at 23-51. In addition to rejecting statutory restrictions on independent expenditures, the
Buckley Court overturned limits on campaign expenditures by candidates from their personal funds
and limits on overall campaign expenditures. Id. at 51-58. The Court upheld provisions of the Act
limiting campaign contributions to candidates from individuals and political groups, id. at 58, re-
quiring disclosure of contributions and expenditures, id. at 84, and providing public financing for
presidential campaigns, id. at 108.
47. Id. at 16. The Court rejected the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia that campaign spending limitations constitute restrictions on conduct rather than speech,
and thus are subject to a lower standard of scrutiny. Id. The Court noted that it had "never sug-
gested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to intro-
duce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." Id.
48. Id. at 19.
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to communicate.4 9 The Court concluded that "although the Act's contribution
and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment inter-
ests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on pro-
tected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on
financial contributions."5 0
By far the more significant aspect of the Court's analysis is its exploration
of government interests that might justify limitations on campaign spending.
Concerning restrictions on contributions, the Court had little trouble upholding
the statute on the basis of its "primary purpose," that of "limit[ing] the actuality
and appearance of corruption."5 1 The Court reasoned that large contributions
"given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office hold-
ers" clearly threaten the integrity of representative democracy. 52 Additionally,
the Court expressed serious concern for "the impact of the appearance of cor-
ruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent
in a regime of large individual financial contributions. '5 3
The Court found these governmental interests insufficient to support the
restrictions on independent expenditures, however. These limitations, the Court
held, constrain political expression "'at the core of our electoral process and of
the First Amendment freedoms.' ,,4 Moreover, the Court reasoned that the po-
tential difficulty in coordinating independent expenditures with the candidate's
campaign would hamper the effectiveness of these expenditures, which might, in
fact, prove counterproductive.55 For these reasons and others, the Court con-
cluded, "the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption is inadequate to justify [the] ceiling on independent expendi-
tures."15 6 The Court also rejected arguments that the government interest in
49. Id. at 20-21. The Court further explained:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views
but, does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of commu-
nication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution,
since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.
Id. at 21.
50. Id. at 23. The conceptualization of contributions as "proxy speech," as it is now termed,
has drawn substantial criticism. Nahra, supra note 38, at 82-83. Indeed, in Federal Election Com-
mission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1984), Justice Marshall,
who wrote for the majority in Austin, abandoned the "proxy speech" view stating that the distinction
makes no constitutional difference. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
52. Id. at 26-27.
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
55. Id. at 47. The Court explained:
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to
the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prear-
rangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only
undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate.
Id.
56. Id. at 45. The Court rejected Congress' practical rationale for the independent expenditure
limitation. As expressed in the Senate Report on the 1974 amendments: "[o prohibit a $60,000
direct contribution to be used for a TV spot commercial but then to permit the would-be contributor
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equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence elections
could justify the statute. Such a concept, the Court held, "is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment."'57
Though the Buckley decision did not address regulation of campaign spend-
ing by corporations specifically, it laid the groundwork for consideration of the
corporate spending question in the Court's next major campaign finance deci-
sion, First National Bank v. Bellotti.5 8 In Bellotti a group of Massachusetts busi-
ness corporations brought suit contesting the constitutionality of a state statute
prohibiting the expenditure of corporate treasury funds on ballot issues not "ma-
terially affecting" the corporation's business.59 In a five-four decision, the
Supreme Court struck down the law.6°
Significantly, the Court refused to decide Bellotti on "the abstract question
whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy
under the First Amendment. ' 6 1 Instead, the Court noted that the first amend-
ment protects corporate speech if its impairment would undermine society's in-
terest in free and open discussion. 62 Holding that the expression barred by the
to purchase the time himself, and place a commercial endorsing the candidate, would exalt constitu-
tional form over substance." S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5587, 5604-05.
57. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. The Court wrote:
[Tihe concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,
which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources,'" and "'to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."' The First Amend-
ment's protection against government abridgment of free expression cannot properly be
made to depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public discussion.
Id. (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))) (citations
omitted).
58. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
59. MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1977) (amended 1986) (held unconstitutional in
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795). The statute, in relevant part, provided:
No business corporation incorporated under the laws of or doing business in the common-
wealth ... shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend, or contribute ... any money or
other valuable thing for the purpose of aiding promoting or preventing the nomination or
election of any person to public office, or aiding, promoting or antagonizing the interests of
any political party, or influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the
voters other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the
corporation. No question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the
income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the
property, business or assets of the corporation.
Id. The statute had a checkered past. Massachusetts courts had struck down previous versions in
suits arising from corporate expenditures opposing statewide tax referenda proposed by the legisla-
ture. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 769 n.3. The version of the statute at issue in Bellotti had been amended
only one month before the Massachusetts legislature voted to submit to voters a constitutional
amendment authorizing the imposition of a graduated personal income tax. See id.
60. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795.
61. Id. at 777.
62. Id. The Court wrote: "'IThere is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of
[the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.'... The inherent
worth of ... speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the
identity of its source, whether a corporation, association, union, or individual." Id. at 776-77 (quot-
ing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
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Massachusetts law was clearly "the type of speech indispensable to decisionmak-
ing in a democracy," 63 the Court concluded that the statute "plainly offended"
the first amendment.64 Further, the Court noted that Massachusetts could not
deny corporations this protection merely on the basis that as creatures of statute,
the corporations possess only rights granted them by the state.65
The Bellotti Court rejected arguments that Massachusetts had a compelling
state interest in protecting the rights of shareholders who disagree with views
expressed by the corporation. 66 The statute, the Court concluded, was underin-
clusive for this purpose because it did not bar other forms of corporate political
expression, such as lobbying or discussion of public concerns not connected with
a particular election. 67 Moreover, the Court reasoned, the statute was overin-
clusive for the purpose because it prevented corporate expression even with re-
spect to issues on which all shareholders agreed. 68 The Court also rejected
suggestions that the statute was a constitutional attempt to limit massive corpo-
rate spending that might "unduly influence" elections. 69 "[T]he fact that advo-
cacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it .... [T]he
people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and
evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments." °70 The Bellotti Court
acknowledged, however, that concerns over undue influence, when combined
with the appearance of corruption in a candidate election, might justify govern-
ment regulation.71
63. Id. at 777.
64. Id. at 785.
65. Id. at 778 & n.14. In an extensive footnote rebutting the proposition that corporate form
could be the basis for denial of first amendment rights, the Court wrote:
The Massachusetts court did not go so far as to accept appellee's argument that corpora-
tions, as creatures of the State, have only those rights granted them by the State. The court
below recognized that such an extreme position could not be reconciled either with the
many decisions holding state laws invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment when they
infringe protected speech by corporate bodies, or with decisions affording corporations the
protection of constitutional guarantees other than the First Amendment .... In cases
where corporate speech has been denied the shelter of the First Amendment, there is no
suggestion that the reason was because a corporation rather than an individual or associa-
tion was involved. Corporate identity has been determinative in several decisions denying
corporations certain constitutional rights, such as the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination.... but this is not because the States are free to define the rights of their
creatures without constitutional limit. Otherwise, corporations could be denied the protec-
tion of all constitutional guarantees, including due process and the equal protection of the
laws.... Whether or not a particular guarantee is "purely personal" or is unavailable to
corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the
particular constitutional provision.
Id. n.14 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 792-95.
67. Id. at 793.
68. Id. at 794-95.
69. Id. at 788-92.
70. Id. at 790-91. The Court held that "the risk of corruption perceived in cases involving
candidate elections... simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue." Id. at 790. Even if
such a risk could be found, the Court asserted, proponents of the statute had not shown that corpo-
rations were an "overwhelming or even significant" force in influencing referenda, or that corporate
expenditures had undermined citizen confidence in the government. Id. at 789-90.
71. Id. at 788 n.26. In a footnote to its undue influence discussion, the Court noted:
The importance of the governmental interest in preventing [corruption] ... has never been
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The Court's next major campaign financing decision involving a corpora-
tion was Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee.72
In this case, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) sought to enforce statutory
limitations on the class of persons from whom the National Right to Work
Committee (NRWC), a nonstock corporation, might solicit contributions for its
segregated political fund.73 A unanimous Court concluded that though the
challenged restrictions burdened the NRWC's first amendment associational
freedoms, they served a compelling government interest in "ensur[ing] that sub-
stantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages [of]... the
corporate form of organization . . . not be converted into political 'war
chests.' "74 This reasoning, the Court asserted, was consistent with its affirma-
tion in Buckley of the "importance of preventing both the actual corruption
threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence
in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption."' 75
In reaching its conclusion, the Court in National Right to Work Committee
gave considerable weight to the corporate form of the regulated entity.76 Noting
that the challenged statute represented a careful refinement of previous federal
restrictions on corporate campaign contributions, the Court concluded that it
owed "considerable deference" to the "legislative judgment that the special
characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful
regulation."'77
The National Right to Work Committee Court also found the statutory re-
strictions justified on a second ground, that of protecting individual shareholders
of corporations from unwillingly funding speech with which they disagree. 78
The Court did not, however, articulate a clear rationale for the shareholders'
interest.
In 1986, four years after its decision in National Right to Work Commit-
tee,79 the Court returned to the subject of corporate campaign spending in Fed-
doubted.... [O]ur consideration of a corporation's right to speak ... implies no compara-
ble right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign for election to
public office. Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real
or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate
elections.
Id.
72. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
73. Id. at 198-99.
74. Id. at 207.
75. Id. at 208.
76. See id. at 208-11.
77. Id. at 209-10.
78. Id. at 207-08. The FEC argued that the statute protected individuals who had paid money
into a corporation for economic purposes from having that money used to support candidates whom
they would ordinarily oppose as individuals. The Court "agree[d] with the petitioners" that this
purpose, and the purpose of limiting "corruption or the appearance of corruption," were sufficient to
justify the statute. The Court then went on to deliver a considered explanation of the corruption
rationale, but did not treat further the notion of shareholder protection.
79. Three years after National Right to Work Committee and a year before deciding Massachu.
setts Citizens for Life, the Court handed down a major campaign finance regulation opinion in Fed-
eral Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Commission, 470 U.S. 480
(1985). In that case, the Court struck down a federal statute limiting independent expenditures by
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eral Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life.80 At issue in
Massachusetts Citizens for Life was the right of a nonprofit ideological corpora-
tion to expend general treasury funds to influence elections for federal office.8 1
In a judgment that belied the opinion's significance, the Court held the prohibi-
tion, a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),8 2 unconstitu-
tional as applied.8 3
Significantly, the Court refrained from deciding the case on the basis of the
"corporate form" rationale applied in its holding in National Right to Work
Committee. National Right to Work Committee, the Court held, involved re-
strictions on solicitation of contributions by incorporated political committees
that in turn funnelled the collected funds to candidates in the form of campaign
contributions. 84 Thus, the Court asserted, while the holding: in National Right
to Work Committee was a logical extension of the contribution analysis in Buck-
ley, similar reasoning could not be applied directly in Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, in which the challenged activity involved independent expenditures.8 5
The Court, however, did not abandon its National Right to Work Commit-
tee reasoning entirely. In an extensive analysis of the federal law governing in-
dependent expenditures, the Court recast the corruption-based rationale
articulated in National Right to Work Committee as an interest in assuring that
funds amassed through the corporate form would not distort the "the political
marketplace."'8 6 "The resources in the treasury of a business corporation," the
Court wrote, "are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's
political ideas."8 7 Instead, the Court reasoned, such funds "reflect ... the eco-
nomically motivated decisions of investors and customers."88 The Court held
that FECA had sought to eliminate the potential for corporate spending not
political action committees. Id. at 501. Though the National Conservative Political Action Com-
mittee (NCPAC) was incorporated, the Court focused primarily on the organization's character as a
political committee. The Court specifically noted that it did not reach "the question whether a
corporation can constitutionally be restricted in making independent expenditures to influence elec-
tions for public office." Id. at 496.
80. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
81. Id. at 241.
82. FECA of 1971, supra note 39, Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.). See supra note 39 for the relevant portion of the statute.
83. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263.
84. Id. at 259.
85. See id. at 259-60.
86. Id. at 257-58. The Court wrote:
Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that resources
amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace. Political "free trade" does not necessarily require that all who par-
ticipate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources. Relative availabil-
ity of funds is after all a rough barometer of public support. The resources in the treasury
of a business corporation, however, are not an indication of popular support for the corpo-
ration's political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of inves-
tors and customers. The availability of these resources may make the corporation a
formidable presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the
power of its ideas.
Id. (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 258.
88. Id.
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based on popular support by requiring corporations to speak only through segre-
gated funds whose resources were based on noncorporate contributions.8 9 These
restrictions, the Court wrote, were "meant to ensure that competition among
actors in the political arena is truly competition among ideas." 9
Having thus outlined the nature of government interests supporting the reg-
ulation of corporate independent expenditures, the Court explained that such
justifications could not support application of expenditure limitations to Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL). "Some corporations," the Court asserted,
"have features more akin to voluntary political associations than business firms,
and therefore should not have to bear burdens on independent spending solely
because of their incorporated status." 91 MCFL in particular, the Court held,
possessed three "essential" characteristics that placed it beyond the statute's
constitutional boundaries. 92 First, MCFL was an ideological corporation
"formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas" and did not par-
ticipate in business activities. 93 Thus, its resources could not be disproportion-
ate to popular support for the ideas it espoused.94 Second, MCFL had "no
shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or
earnings."'95 Therefore, the National Right to Work Committee rationale of pro-
tecting corporate shareholders from unwillingly supporting speech with which
they disagreed 96 could not be applied to MCFL because "persons connected
with the organization [would] have no economic disincentive for disassociating
with it."97 Finally, the Court noted that MCFL was not established by a busi-
ness corporation and did not accept corporate contributions. Thus, MCFL
could not serve as a conduit for business corporations to spend treasury funds in
the political marketplace. 98
Thus, by carefully distinguishing MCFL from ordinary business corpora-
tions, the Court exempted the organization from FECA restrictions on corpo-
rate expenditures.99 In doing so, however, the Massachusetts Citizens for Life
Court also established an important new rationale for regulating the political
speech of business corporations outside the narrow MCFL exception-that of
protecting the marketplace of ideas from the distorting effects of corporate
wealth.
The Supreme Court's holding in Austin represents the latest in a line of
cases beginning with Buckley in which the Court has struggled to define a con-
sistent rationale for determining which forms of corporate political speech justi-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 259.
91. Id. at 263.
92. Id. at 263-64.
93. Id. at 264.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
97. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264.
98. Id. at 264.
99. Id. at 263.
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flably may be regulated by campaign finance statutes and which may not.1° °
Although not addressing the corporate speech question directly, the Buckley
Court's enduring contribution to this framework is the notion that state regula-
tion can be justified if narrowly tailored "to limit the actuality and appearance of
corruption." 10' Yet the Buckley corruption rationale, which was based essen-
tially in the notion of quid pro quo reciprocation by grateful candidates,10 2
proved too blunt an instrument to address the corporate independent expendi-
tures issue with which the Court wrestled in Massachusetts Citizens for Life and
Austin. In particular, use of the Buckley corruption rationale to uphold govern-
ment regulation of corporate expenditures in candidate elections would have
been tantamount to overruling a portion of Buckley itself because without some
qualification limiting the corruption rationale to the corporate form, the same
reasoning might apply to expenditures by individuals as well.' 0 3
Thus, the Court in Austin was forced to posit a "different type of corruption
in the political arena,"'14 identified by two essential elements: "the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth"; 0 5 and the accumula-
tion of that wealth through the special advantages of the "corporate form."'' 1 6
Though foreshadowed in Massachusetts Citizens for Life,l0 7 the Austin Court's
application of both elements of this "new corruption" rationale to regulation of
corporate independent expenditures constitutes a significant departure from pre-
vious holdings.
As the dissents in Austin pointed out, the Court historically has rejected
attempts to regulate political speech on the basis of the wealth of the speaker.' 08
The Buckley Court gave clear voice to this sentiment in the widely quoted pas-
sage: "[Tihe concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment."' 109 Also, in Bellotti, the Court specifically rejected argu-
ments that the ability of wealthy corporations to unduly influence the outcome
100. See Nahra, supra note 38, at 76-85. In discussing the Court's campaign finance jurispru-
dence up to Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Nahra observed:
The inability of the Court to reach a principled resolution of the contradictions inher-
ent in the contribution/expenditure distinction reflects a broader confusion that has
plagued the Court throughout these cases. The issue, simply put, is when should the Court
allow political reality to influence its first amendment analysis. From the start, the Court
has faced the issue of how much deference it owes to Congress' judgment on the political
risks presented by the potential for campaign abuse, and the Court has shown a wavering
deference to Congress' arguable expertise.
Id. at 83-84 (footnotes omitted).
101. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
103. Buckley struck down federal restrictions on independent expenditures by individuals, find-
ing that such spending could not reasonably be connected with "corruption or the appearance of
corruption." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45; see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
104. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
108. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1411 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1420-21 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing); supra note 32.
109. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
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of elections could be a basis for limiting corporate speech with respect to ballot
issues.110 Though the Bellotti Court left open the possibility that fear of undue
influence combined with the "danger of real or apparent corruption" in the elec-
tion process might warrant legislative restrictions on corporate spending, " I its
primary concern seemed to be the preservation of voter confidence in the integ-
rity of the election process. 12
The majority in Austin acknowledged the Court's previous unwillingness
"'to equalize the relative influence of speakers,'" but distinguished its new rule
as designed only to "ensure that expenditures reflect actual public support for
the political ideas espoused." 113 Yet the assertion that a speaker's resources
should be proportionate to popular support inherently implies an assumption
that each individual is entitled to an equal voice when speech is aggregated. If
this is so, it is but a short step to suggest that a wealthy individual's speech
should be limited on the ground that her wealth is not proportionate to popular
support for her ideas.
The Austin Court recognized the inherent difficulty in upholding the chal-
lenged statute as an attempt to assure proportionality between campaign spend-
ing and popular support for political ideas espoused, for it quickly limited this
proposition with the second element of its "new corruption" test-that of corpo-
rate form." 4 The Court stated that "the mere fact that corporations may accu-
mulate large amounts of wealth is not the justification for [the law]; rather, the
unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large
treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures."' "I5 As the dissents
note, however, the suggestion that corporate form may be a basis for regulation
of independent expenditures is not supported by the Court's prior first amend-
ment jurisprudence. 1 6 In Bellotti, in particular, the Court specifically rejected
the notion that first amendment rights could be withheld on the basis that corpo-
rations are "creatures of the state" possessing only those rights granted by the
110. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-92 (1978); see supra notes 69-70 and accom-
panying text.
111. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
112. See supra note 71.
113. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397-98. The full text of the Court's rebuttal on this point is as fol-
lows: "The Act does not attempt 'to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections;' rather,
it ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corpora-
tions." Id. (quoting Justice Kennedy's dissent, id. at 1421 (Kennedy J., dissenting)).
114. See id. at 1397.
115. Id. at 1398.
116. See id. at 1408 (Scalia, 3., dissenting); id at 1418-19 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see supra note
31. Justice Scalia, noting the majority's efforts to link its wealth-based "corruption" rationale with
the limiting requirement of the special privileges of corporate form, issued a particularly biting
criticism:
[The majority attempts] to make one valid proposition out of two invalid ones: When the
vessel labeled "corruption" begins to founder under weight too great to be logically sus-
tained, the argumentation jumps to the good ship "special privilege"; and when that in
turn begins to go down, it returns to "corruption." Thus hopping back and forth between
the two, the argumentation may survive but makes no headway towards port, where its
conclusion waits in vain.




The majority's rationale in Austin does not abrogate the Bellotti admonition
by suggesting that a state may withhold a corporation's constitutional rights.
Instead, the Austin Court returned to the arguments offered in National Right to
Work Committee,118 and affirmed in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 119 to sug-
gest that the corporate form of a speaker lowers the threshold that government
interests must reach to justify regulation of speech. In this respect, the Austin
Court avoided the basic question of whether corporations possess the same basic
speech rights as individuals. The Court simply concluded that whatever rights a
corporation may have, they are subject to more exacting scrutiny and higher
levels of regulation than individuals because of the "special advantages"120 of
the corporate form. This differentiating principle established, the Court posited
the newly articulated concern for the "corrosive and distorting effects of im-
mense aggregations of wealth" 12 1 as a government interest sufficient to meet the
reduced constitutional threshold for speech regulation. Through this line of rea-
soning, the Court overcame both the Bellotti admonition against withholding
speech rights and the Massachusetts Citizens for Life Court's decision that tradi-
tional quid pro quo corruption,122 even when associated with a corporate
speaker, cannot justify limitations on corporate independent expenditures. 123
The most immediate issue left unresolved by Austin is the exact scope of the
Massachusetts Citizens for Life exemption for certain noncommercial corpora-
tions.124 The key to the exemption is the three-part Massachusetts Citizens for
Life test that provides that expenditure regulations will be unconstitutional as
applied to corporations that are ideological in purpose, present no economic dis-
incentives to members wishing to disassociate themselves with the corporation's
speech, and are incapable of serving as conduits for political spending by tradi-
tional business corporations.1 25 All three elements of the test were described as
117. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978); see supra note 65.
118. 459 U.S. 197 (1982); see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
119. 479 U.S. 238 (1986); see supra notes 86-89.
120. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
123. In Massachusetts Citizens for Life the Court held that restrictions on corporate expenditures
could not be justified by legislative concern for the type of quid pro quo corruption identified in
Buckley, even when the challenged restrictions were applied to corporate speakers. Because of this
holding, the Massachusetts Citizens for Life Court was forced to posit the more compelling govern-
ment interest in limiting the "corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth," Fed'l Election
Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986), which was ultimately applied
to uphold the statute in Austin.
124. Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, suggested that the majority's holding also brings organiza-
tions such as the Sierra Club and the American Civil Liberties Union within the constitutionally
permissible scope of corporate expenditure regulation. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 35.
125. In a footnote to his concurrence Justice Brennan wrote this capsule summary of the three-
part Massachusetts Citizens for Life test: "If a nonprofit corporation is formed with the express
purpose of promoting political ideas, is not composed of members who face an economic incentive
for disassociating with it, and does not accept contributions from business corporations or labor
unions, then it would be governed by our [Massachusetts Citizens for Life] holding." Austin, 110 S.
Ct. at 1405 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a full discussion of the MCFL test, see supra notes 91-
98 and accompanying text.
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"essential" in both. Massachusetts Citizens for Lfe 126 and Austin,127 implying
that all three elements must be met for a corporation to qualify.' 28 It is not
certain, however, that the test must be applied so mechanically. Because the
Austin Court held that the Michigan Chamber failed all three elements of the
test,' 29 the holding does not support the proposition that failure to meet a single
element of the test will be fatal. Further, one can argue that the three elements
do not constitute a test at all, but rather are designed to serve as guidelines. This
interpretation is supported by the fact that both the Massachusetts Citizens for
Life and Austin Courts prefaced their discussion of the exemption by noting that
corporations should not be burdened by expenditure restrictions if their "'fea-
tures [are] more akin to voluntary political associations than business
firms.'-130 Likewise, in its assessment of the Michigan Chamber under the
test's second element, the Austin Court noted that members of the Chamber are
"more similar to shareholders of a business corporation than to the members of
MCFL."131 This language implies that application of the Massachusetts Citizens
for Life exemption involves an overall assessment of an organization's character-
istics in an effort to determine whether it is essentially commercial or noncom-
mercial in character.
In addition to questions surrounding the general application of the Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life test, the Court left itself considerable flexibility in the
application of at least two of the test's elements-the necessity of an ideological
purpose132 and the requirement that members not have an economic disincen-
tive for disassociating themselves from the corporation. With respect to the
"ideological purpose" element, the Court has clearly indicated that its objective
is to "ensure[ ] that [an organization's] political resources reflect political sup-
port." 1 3 3 Whether such "corporate purposes" are sufficiently narrow or focused
to qualify in this regard is a subjective matter entailing considerable judicial
flexibility.
The requirement that members of the corporation face no economic disin-
centive to withdrawal from the corporation also engenders judicial flexibility.
The Massachusetts Citizens for Life Court originally posited this element of the
test as the absence of "shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a
claim on its assets or earnings." 134 The Michigan Chamber's nonstock status
forced the Austin Court to cite the Chamber's "educational and outreach" pro-
126. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263.
127. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
128. In Massachusetts Citizens for Life the Court found that Massachusetts Citizens for Life met
all three of the test's requirements. Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 263-64.
129. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398-1400.
130. Id. at 1398 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263).
131. Id. at 1399.
132. Specifically, the Austin and Massachusetts Citizens for Life Courts held that to qualify under
the first element, a corporation must be "'formed for the express purpose of promoting political
ideas, and cannot engage in business activities.'" Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1399 (quoting Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264).




grams as economic benefits violative of the member disassociation test.135 This
broad reading of the test goes considerably beyond the Massachusetts Citizens for
Lie Court's original "claim on earnings" thesis and expands the range of activi-
ties that will disqualify corporations form the Massachusetts Citizens for Life
exception. Yet Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in Austin, dismissed as "in-
accurate" assertions that the majority's holding would encompass such organi-
zations as the Sierra Club, which provide educational programs and other
assistance to their members. 136 Though Justice Brennan articulated no clear
rationale for distinguishing such organizations, his comments suggest that the
Court may have more to say regarding the nature of "economic disincentives" in
future holdings.
Though the exact nature of the Massachusetts Citizens for Life exception
represents the most obvious question resulting from Austin, the decision also has
significance in other respects. In particular, Austin casts considerable doubt on
the continuing validity of the Bellotti ban on regulations prohibiting corporate
expenditures in ballot issue elections. The Bellotti Court expressly rejected argu-
ments that government regulation could be justified as an appropriate attempt to
limit corporate spending which might "unduly influence" elections. 137 Yet it is
exactly this corporate influence-denominated in Austin as "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth"' 38-that Austin holds ade-
quate as a justification for government regulation of corporate expenditures. 139
In neither Bellotti nor Austin did the wealth of the corporate defendants bear a
demonstrable relationship to popular support for the positions they espoused. 140
Further, while Bellotti is distinguishable from Austin on the basis of the type of
election involved, the objective of preventing distortion of the political market-
place would apply equally to either candidate or ballot issue elections. Thus,
Austin arguably has established a new ground on which governments may regu-
late corporate expenditures in any election process-that of assuring that cam-
paign expenditures for political speech reflect popular support for the ideas
espoused. 141
135. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1399.
136. Id. at 1405 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan was addressing Justice Ken-
nedy's dissenting opinion which suggested that under the Austin rationale, organizations such as the
Sierra Club and the American Civil Liberties Union would be prohibited from making independent
expenditures. Id. at 1418 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see supra note 35.
137. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-92 (1978); see supra notes 69-71 and accom-
panying text. The Bellotti Court hinted that the potential for undue influence, combined with the
potential for corruption might justify government regulation of expenditures. Id. at 788 n.26. The
Austin Court, however, makes no mention of the prevention of traditional quid pro quo corruption as
an element necessary to its upholding of the Michigan statute.
138. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
139. Id. at 1397-98.
140. Cf id. at 1402 (Michigan Chamber of Commerce does not exhibit characteristics that
would require exemption from the statute); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 811 (White, J., dissenting) (noting
that corporate expenditures against subject ballot issue in Bellotti far exceeded private expenditures
in support of the issue). But cf. id. at 789 n.28 (suggesting that campaign spending records for the
ballot issue in Bellotti were inadequate to support an accurate picture of contributions and expendi-
tures for and against the issue).
141. In his concurrence in Austin, Justice Brennan distinguished the holdings in both Austin and
Massachusetts Citizens for Life from the Bellotti holding in that the statute at issue in Bellotti made
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Finally, Austin may have implications for corporate speech in other con-
texts. The Court has expanded widely the scope of corporate speech rights in
recent years.142 The Austin Court's use of the "special advantages" of corporate
form as a rationale for restricting corporate speech in the context of elections
may pave the way for the use of similar reasoning with respect to government
regulation of currently protected corporate speech. Austin's impact on speech
by corporate media organizations also will be of interest. The majority in Austin
acknowledged the apparent inconsistency in exempting media corporations from
the Michigan statute's expenditure restrictions, but explained that media corpo-
rations differ from other corporations in their devotion to "collection of infor-
mation and its dissemination to the public."' 143 On this basis, the majority noted
that the Court has "consistently recognized the unique role that the press plays
in 'informing and educating the public.' 144 While the majority's reasoning
may explain why the statute's media exemption does not violate equal protec-
tion, it does not, as Justice Scalia observed, articulate a constitutional ground for
exempting media corporations from government regulation under the "new cor-
ruption" rationale.145
In the decade and a half since Congress's enactment of a comprehensive
campaign finance law in 1974, the Supreme Court has labored to forge an inte-
grated system ofjurisprudence that fairly addresses the application of those laws
to corporate and individual speakers. As the latest expression of this effort, the
Court's holding in Austin melds two controversial concepts-the notions of reg-
ulation on the basis of wealth and regulation on the basis of corporate form-to
devise a rule that permits regulation of corporate independent expenditures
without impairing similar rights in individuals. The Court's holding upholds a
well-established legislative judgment that in the realm of campaign finance regu-
lation corporations warrant closer scrutiny and tighter regulation than individu-
als. Yet this accommodation of legislative judgment has a price. In considering
the "corrosive effects" of wealth amassed through the advantages of corporate
form, the Court reverses its historic refusal to allow economic considerations to
no provision for corporate political action committees, thereby effecting a "complete foreclosure of
any opportunity for political speech." Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1402 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 259 n.12). While this observation certainly distinguishes
Bellotti factually, it also is a tacit admission that in the presence of a statutory option to create a
corporate political action committee, regulation of corporate expenditures in ballot issue elections is
valid under the "new corruption" rationale advanced in Austin.
142. See Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal. Corporations and the Bill ofRights, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 577, 611-18 (1990). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 16.26-16.31, at 904-24 (3d ed. 1986) ("Until recently it has been commonly assumed that
all commercial speech... is excluded from the coverage of the first amendment. Now commercial
speech appears to be vested with extensive first amendment protection. The state can issue reason-
able time, place, or manner regulations of such speech.").
143. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1401-02.
144. Id. at 1402 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781).
145. Id. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting; see supra note 37. Justice Scalia goes on to opine:
Members of the institutional press, despite the Court's approval of their illogical exemption
from the Michigan law, will find little reason for comfort in today's decision. The theory of
New Corruption it espouses is a dagger at their throat. The Court today holds merely that
media corporations may be excluded from the Michigan law, not that they must be.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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color or restrict first amendment rights to political speech. 146 By linking the
validity of this wealth-oriented campaign finance regulation to speakers adopting
the corporate form, the Court, for the present, has limited the applicability of
the new rationale to the corporate context. Yet in so doing, the Court also has
established firmly the principle that the corporate form of a speaker may be
considered in determining the potency of its first amendment rights.' 47 The
Austin Court stated emphatically that these twin precepts of the new corporate
expenditure rule operate only in tandem, and that consideration of a speaker's
financial assets, in particular, is relevant only with respect to regulation of the
corporate form. It seems likely, however, that the Court will face pressure to
extend both elements of its new rationale to other contexts. Whether such pres-
sures can be resisted well may compose the next chapter in the Court's campaign
finance jurisprudence.
SAMUEL M. TAYLOR
146. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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